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DEFINING THE AMBIT OF THE FREE SPEECH PRIVILEGE IN NEW 
ZEALAND’S PARLIAMENT  
 
The various immunities and powers falling under the broad rubric of “parliamentary 
privilege” perform an important function in New Zealand’s constitutional structure.1 
The Clerk of the New Zealand House of Representatives recently summed up the role 
played by this area of law as follows: 
Privilege is part of the way in which the separation of powers is delineated 
in our political system and is a principal means of effecting a modus 
vivendi between the legislature and the other two branches of government. 
… Parliamentary privilege, so far as the legislature is concerned, helps to 
preserve Parliament’s freedom from outside control and to give it and its 
members the legal tools and confidence they will need to perform their 
constitutional functions.2 
 
However, parliamentary privilege is not a self-defining concept. Someone has to 
decide whether or not a particular matter falls within the ambit of one of Parliament’s 
various privileges. In the recent case of Jennings v Buchanan,3 the Privy Council 
reasserted the judiciary’s role in performing this task,4 in keeping with its general 
systems-function as interpreter and declarer of the law. This case required judicial 
consideration of the extent of Parliament’s “free speech” privilege ¾ the absolute 
privilege accorded to words spoken during proceedings in Parliament ¾ in the 
                                               
1 See generally Campbell E, Parliamentary Privilege (2003); Joseph P, Constitutional and 
Administrative Law in New Zealand (2nd ed, 2001) at 386-440; McGee D, Parliamentary 
Practice in New Zealand (2nd ed, 1994). 
2 McGee D, “The scope of parliamentary privilege” [2004] New Zealand Law Journal 84 at 
84. 
3 [2004] UKPC 36. 
4 See Stockdale v Hansard (1830) 112 ER 1112 at 1154 (per Lord Denman); 1173-74 (per 
Littledale J). See also Awatere Huata v Prebble [2004] 3 NZLR 359 at para 59 (CA) (per 
McGrath J). 
context of whether an accusation made during parliamentary proceedings by a 
member of Parliament (MP) can be used in defamation proceedings to provide a 
meaning to a later affirmation made outside of such proceedings. 
 This case, for obvious reasons, was of concern to parliamentarians from its 
very outset. It was referred to Parliament’s privileges committee in 1998,5 but that 
body’s investigation of the issues involved was put on hold while the case remained 
before the courts. Now that the Privy Council has issued a definitive decision, the 
privileges committee has begun to consider what action (if any) it will recommend the 
House take in light of the judgement. Simply put, the privileges committee must 
decide if Parliament ought to replace the judiciary’s interpretation of the extent of the 
free speech privilege with its own decision on the matter. This comment outlines the 
Privy Council’s decision in Jennings v Buchanan, and unpicks the reasons for the 
Court’s judgement. It then considers some potential problems with the judicial 
approach taken, problems which may give the privileges committee cause to 
recommend that the House move to legislate to overturn the decision. Finally, it 
makes some suggestions as to the form such legislation should take. 
 
The Privy Council’s decision in Jennings v Buchanan 
The Jennings v Buchanan litigation had been refined to a single issue by the time it 
reached the Privy Council; viz, whether a plaintiff is entitled to refer to a statement 
made during a proceeding of Parliament in order to attribute a defamatory meaning to 
an extra-parliamentary statement made at a later date. Mr Jennings, an MP speaking 
in the House, accused Mr Buchanan, a member of the New Zealand Wool Board, of a 
                                               
5 Privileges Committee, Question of privilege referred on 21 July 1998 concerning Buchanan 
v Jennings, CP No IC9/98. 
gross abuse of his official position.6 Subsequently, Mr Jennings told a newspaper that 
“he did not resile from his claim about the official’s relationship, just the money.”7 Mr 
Buchanan then sued for defamation, claiming that Mr Jennings’ comment to the 
newspaper amounted to an affirmation of his earlier parliamentary allegation, which 
constituted a re-publication of the words outside of the House.8 The case therefore 
required a judicial determination of the extent of the absolute privilege attaching to 
the speech of MP’s and other participants in Parliament’s proceedings, as 
encapsulated in article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688; “… the freedom of speech and 
debates or proceedings ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or place 
out of Parliament.”9 
 The NZ Court of Appeal, by a 4-1 majority,10 had found that Mr Jennings’ 
published comment constituted an affirmation of his earlier allegation in Parliament,11 
before further accepting that this parliamentary statement could be referred to as a 
matter of “historical fact” in order to give a defamatory meaning to the bare 
                                               
6 Namely, that Mr Buchanan had procured Board sponsorship of a rugby tour to the United 
Kingdom so as to be able to continue an extra-marital affair with another member of the 
Board. 
7 Or words to that effect; see Jennings v Buchanan [2004] UKPC 36 at para 5. Mr Jennings 
also wrote a letter to the same newspaper demanding a general inquiry into Mr Buchanan’s 
activities. 
8 See R v Abingdon (1749) 170 ER 337; R v Creevy (1813) 105 ER 102.  
9 Art 9 is in force in New Zealand by virtue of the Legislature Act 1908 (NZ), s 242, and the 
Imperial Laws Application Act 1988 (NZ), s 3(1). Its effect is affirmed by the Defamation Act 
1992 (NZ), s 13(1) (“Proceedings in the House of Representatives are protected by absolute 
privilege.”) 
10 Buchanan v Jennings [2002] 3 NZLR 145 (CA).  
11 The majority also made use of the phrases “effective repetition” and “adoption by 
reference”. 
affirmation.12 This holding heavily relied upon the Privy Council’s decision in 
Prebble v Television New Zealand,13 where their Lordships had voiced “no objection” 
to a party alleging in court “the occurrence of events or the saying of certain words in 
Parliament without any accompanying allegation of impropriety or any other 
questioning”.14 And because the majority held the later, extra-parliamentary 
affirmation was the basis for the defamation claim (with the earlier parliamentary 
statement merely completing any gap in the meaning of this affirmation), there was no 
impeachment or questioning of the parliamentary statement itself.15 Furthermore, the 
majority did not believe that the underlying purpose of art. 9 was threatened by this 
approach: “The prospect of the present proceedings would not have inhibited the 
appellant at the time he spoke in the House. It was only his unprotected later 
statement that enabled the proceedings to be brought.”16 
The majority’s decision was the subject of some academic criticism in New 
Zealand,17 with these critics championing Tipping J’s lone dissent; viz, the “only 
secure and principled approach is to limit the plaintiff, for the purpose of establishing 
the necessary ingredients of his cause of action, to words which have been spoken or 
                                               
12 Or, as the majority put it; “any gap in the public statement was plainly to be completed by 
going to the published proceedings of Parliament or other available (and generally privileged) 
sources of the statement”. Buchanan v Jennings [2002] 3 NZLR 145 at para 52 (CA). 
13 [1994] 3 NZLR 1 (PC).  
14 Prebble v TVNZ [1994] 3 NZLR 1 (PC) at 34. See also Hyams v Peterson [1991] 3 NZLR 
648 at 656 (CA) (per Cooke P). 
15 This finding echoed that made in two Australian cases, Beitzel v Crabb [1992] 2 VR 121; 
Laurence v Katter (1996) 141 ALR 447. But see Rann v Olsen (2000) 76 SASR 450. 
16 Buchanan v Jennings [2002] 3 NZLR 145 (CA) para 53 (emphasis in the original). 
17 McGee, n 2; Allan J, “Parliamentary Privilege: Will The Empire Strike Back?” (2002) 20 
New Zealand Universities Law Review 205; Joseph P, “Constitutional Law”, [2003] New 
Zealand Law Review 387, pp 428-432. 
written outside the House by the MP personally.”18 The Speaker of the House 
appeared to share this view, as he invited the Attorney General to seek leave 
(subsequently granted) to intervene in support of Mr Jennings’ appeal to the Privy 
Council. 
However, the Privy Council preferred the reasoning of the Court of Appeal 
majority, and unanimously rejected the appeal. Their Lordships noted that the case 
raised a tension between “the need to afford a measure of protection to the reputation 
and credit of individuals”,19 and the “value of free and open communication” 
protected by the absolute privilege given to parliamentary statements,20 as guaranteed 
by art. 9. The claim that art. 9 precluded the courts from taking any judicial notice of 
what is said in Parliament was then rejected. Such statements already are referred to 
as an aid in interpreting statutes,21 and as evidence of the lawfulness or otherwise of 
ministerial actions.22 Parliament itself, as demonstrated by the Report of the Joint 
Committee on Parliamentary Privilege,23 appears to have acquiesced in this state of 
affairs. Therefore, their Lordships held, art. 9 is not breached so long as a 
parliamentary statement only is used to give meaning to a subsequent affirmation of 
                                               
18 Buchanan v Jennings [2002] 3 NZLR 145 para 141 (CA). 
19 Jennings v Buchanan [2004] UKPC 36 para 6. 
20 Jennings v Buchanan [2004] UKPC 36 para 8. 
21 Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593. 
22 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Brind [1991] 1 AC 696; R v 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Ex p World Development 
Movement Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 386; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Fire 
Brigades Union [1995] 2 AC 513. 
23 HL 43-I / HC 214-I, 9 April, 1999, paras 42 & 49. Although this report was by a 
Committee of the UK Parliament, the Privy Council felt it relevant as “there is no distinction 
to be drawn between the law of New Zealand and that of the United Kingdom so far as 
concerns the issue in this appeal.” Jennings v Buchanan [2004] UKPC 36 at para 16. 
that statement,24 because participants in parliamentary proceedings still enjoy absolute 
privilege when speaking in that forum.25 
As noted at the beginning of this comment, the privileges committee of New 
Zealand’s Parliament is now considering how to respond to the position taken by the 
Court of Appeal, and subsequently by the Privy Council. Before looking at why it 
might be concerned, however, it is necessary to consider the justifications for 
attaching an absolute privilege to speech made during parliamentary proceedings. An 
appreciation of these justifications in turn illuminates why the courts’ chose to limit 
the extent of that absolute privilege in the fashion that they did. 
 
The basis for Parliament’s “freedom of speech” privilege, and its limitations. 
While the legal basis for the free speech privilege enjoyed by participants in 
Parliament’s proceedings lies in the three century old wording of art. 9, there are two 
bedrock public purpose justifications for retaining this privilege in the present day. 
The such first rationale lies in the role it plays in ensuring the separation of the 
branches of government. Speaking for the Privy Council in the Prebble v TVNZ  case, 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson summarized this goal as follows:  
In addition to article 9 itself, there is a long line of authority which 
supports a wider principle, of which article 9 is merely one manifestation, 
viz, that the courts and Parliament are both astute to recognise their 
respective constitutional roles. So far as the courts are concerned they will 
not allow any challenge to be made to what is said or done within the 
                                               
24 Jennings v Buchanan [2004] UKPC 36 at para 19. Their Lordships thus expressly approved 
of the New Zealand High Court decision in Peters v Cushing [1999] NZAR 241, that a later 
parliamentary statement may not be used to ascribe a defamatory meaning to words spoken 
previously outside of parliamentary proceedings. 
25 Their lordships also rather cryptically suggested; “A statement made out of Parliament may 
enjoy qualified privilege but will not enjoy absolute privilege, even if reference is made to the 
earlier privileged statement.” Jennings v Buchanan [2004] UKPC 36 at para 20. Quite what 
statements might be covered by such a qualified privilege was not indicated. 
walls of Parliament in performance of its legislative functions and 
protection of its established privileges.26 
 
Therefore, by carving out a zone within which Parliament may regulate and control its 
own activities, art. 9 recognises the sovereignty of Parliament as an institution, and 
limits the potential for the courts and the legislature to clash over how Parliament’s 
business ought to be conducted.  
The second rationale for the free speech privilege is that it avoids the “chilling 
effect” that potential legal sanction may have on the speech of those taking part in 
parliamentary proceedings. As Lord Browne-Wilkinson put it: 
The important public interest protected by such privilege is to ensure that 
the member or witness at the time he speaks is not inhibited from stating 
fully and freely what he has to say. If there were any exceptions which 
permitted his statements to be questioned subsequently, at the time when 
he speaks in Parliament he would not know whether or not there would 
subsequently be a challenge to what he is saying. Therefore he would not 
have the confidence the privilege is designed to protect.27 
 
In brief, the general societal benefit of having a representative law-making institution 
where all participants may speak their minds without fear of incurring subsequent 
legal liability is deemed to outweigh any potential harm ¾ whether to an individual 
or otherwise ¾ caused by a given speech act.  
The Privy Council in Jennings v Buchanan acknowledges the ongoing 
significance of these twin public policy concerns.28 However, their Lordships were 
also concerned that the immunity from civil liability flowing from the free speech 
privilege ought not to enable an MP (or other participant in a parliamentary 
proceeding) to persist in publicly maligning an individual citizen’s character. While 
the risk of a false accusation being levelled during the course of Parliament’s business 
                                               
26 Prebble v TVNZ [1994] 3 NZLR 1, at 6-7 (PC). 
27 Prebble v TVNZ [1994] 3 NZLR 1, at 8 (PC). 
28 Jennings v Buchanan [2004] UKPC 36, at paras 8, 10.  
might be a necessary price for guaranteeing robust debate in that arena, an MP (or 
other participant) who continues to raise false accusations outside that forum ¾ even 
if he or she only does so obliquely ¾ should have to account at law for the harm done 
to the citizen concerned. Their Lordships thus reduced the scope of art. 9 to a policy 
that participants only need remain free to speak in an uninhibited fashion while 
directly involved in the proceedings of Parliament.29 Having freely spoken in this 
forum, participants ought to exercise “a degree of circumspection” before affirming 
any potentially defamatory statement outside of Parliament,30 for there is no benefit 
¾ but potentially considerable individual reputational harm ¾ in drawing ongoing 
public attention to an untrue accusation made against an individual citizen. 
I suggest, therefore, that the Privy Council’s decision regarding the extent of 
the free speech privilege relies upon a form of cost-benefit reasoning with regard to 
parliamentary speech. The bench saw their decision as posing little potential harm to 
the ability of participants to speak freely while directly involved in parliamentary 
proceedings ¾ although it may make participants more careful subsequently when 
commenting on their parliamentary statements. Against this minor (even negligible) 
perceived harm, the right to sue for any subsequent affirmation potentially defamatory 
parliamentary statement carries the benefit of protecting private individuals from 
suffering the harm of an ongoing defamation of their character ¾ or, at least, enabling 
them to claim compensation for that harm if they are in fact made subject to such 
treatment. 
 
Potential problems with the Jennings v Buchanan decision. 
                                               
29 See n 24 above.  
30 Jennings v Buchanan [2004] UKPC 36, at para 20. 
There are two aspects to the Privy Council’s decision that likely will be of concern to 
Parliament’s privileges committee.31 Firstly, the judgement is built upon something of 
a fib ¾ that the defamation action “really” targets the later extra-parliamentary 
affirmation, not the earlier parliamentary statement. Legal fictions, of course, play an 
important role in our legal system, and so a claim that a judicial decision rests upon a 
falsehood is not of itself a fatal criticism. However, the effect of the present fiction is 
to disguise the fact that the court is involved in directly judging the veracity of a 
statement made during a parliamentary proceeding.32 Taken alone, the subsequent 
affirmation of that parliamentary statement is meaningless. All it provides is a hook 
upon which a court can hang the prior parliamentary statement for scrutiny. Thus, the 
courts actually are stepping into a realm which previously has been closed to them: 
holding members of Parliament (and other  parliamentary participants) directly to 
account for their words and behaviour whilst engaged in a parliamentary proceeding. 
 Furthermore, this step has been taken at a time where there is a markedly 
increased sensitivity on the part of parliamentarians towards judicial intervention onto 
“their” turf. This sensitivity has arisen for a variety of reasons: the political 
consequences of Court of Appeal’s decision that Maori may be able to claim 
aboriginal title to parts of New Zealand’s foreshore and seabed;33 the uncertainties 
caused by the creation of a new Supreme Court to replace the Privy Council at the 
                                               
31 These criticisms echo those earlier made of the Court of Appeal’s majority judgment. See n 
17 above. 
32 Professor Philip Joseph suggested to me that this point becomes clear if we imagine that Mr 
Jennings had relied upon the defence of truth to Mr Buchanan’s action; Defamation Act 1992 
(NZ), s 8. A court could only decide whether this defence applied by investigating whether 
Mr Buchanan had in fact acted as Mr Jennings alleged in his parliamentary statement; i.e., 
had Mr Jennings (wittingly or not) lied to Parliament? 
33 Ngati Apa v Attorney-General [2003] 3 NZLR 643 (CA).  
apex of New Zealand’s judicial hierarchy;34 a dispute between New Zealand’s Chief 
Justice and Deputy Prime Minister over the meaning of “Parliamentary 
Sovereignty”.35 Consequently, Parliament’s privileges committee ¾ along with the 
House in general ¾ will be especially attuned to any breaches of the traditional 
comity shown between the branches of government. Simply put, Parliament is not 
presently in the mood to accept that the judiciary should be given some oversight role 
over the effect of words spoken during its proceedings.  
Secondly, it may be argued persuasively that the fear of a defamation action 
based on some later affirmation of parliamentary speech poses a greater potential 
threat to such speech than the Privy Council’s assessment. For one thing, it is not 
clear exactly what sort of words or conduct will constitute such an “affirmation”. 
There is no apparent “bright line” test here.36 Therefore, a parliamentary participant 
cannot know with any certainty what he or she safely may say publicly in regard to 
any statement he or she has made in Parliament. Flowing from this point is that in our 
media society, parliamentary participants (and MPs in particular) will come under 
intense pressure to comment on, and defend, their parliamentary statements. It is 
debatable whether complete silence on the matter is a realistic option in this climate. 
Equally, it is also questionable whether such complete silence is a desirable option. It 
                                               
34 Supreme Court Act 2003 (NZ). 
35 Compare Elias S, “Sovereignty in the 21st Century: Another spin on the merry-go-round” 
(2003) 14 PLR 148; with Cullen M, “Parliamentary sovereignty and the Courts” [2004] NZLJ 
243. 
36 The difficulty of line-drawing in this area is highlighted by the majority judgment in the 
Court of Appeal; “silence outside the House maintains the protection, as does any statement 
made outside the House which merely acknowledges or does not affirm or effectively repeat 
the defamatory statement. Whether a later statement does affirm or effectively repeat the 
privileged statement is a matter of fact to be determined in the circumstances of the case.” 
Buchanan v Jennings [2002] 3 NZLR 145 at para 62 (CA). 
would reduce the ability of the media (and hence the public) to hold accountable an 
MP for their statements, in that a member may well use the threat of potential lawsuits 
to duck all questions relating to the words he or she has spoken in Parliament. 
Therefore, the uncertainty as to just what sorts of subsequent extra-
parliamentary statements might open up an MP or other parliamentary participant to 
legal liability might have the kind of chilling effect that art. 9 is supposed to avoid. It 
may make the media ¾ which would also be potentially liable for publishing any 
affirmation of a defamatory parliamentary statement ¾ less likely to ask questions 
regarding such statements; or parliamentary participants less likely to answer any 
such questions. Indeed, parliamentary participants may decide that rather than run the 
risk of accidentally later affirming some potentially defamatory parliamentary 
statement, they simply will not speak up in the first place. Or, alternatively, they will 
“hedge and trim” their parliamentary language so as to be sure of avoiding any future 
liability.  
 
Should the holding in Jennings v Buchanan be overridden by Parliament? 
The twin concerns just outlined have real merit, and I do not believe either the 
majority of the Court of Appeal, or the Privy Council, gave them sufficient weight. 
Therefore, the privileges committee would be justified in recommending, and the 
House in enacting, legislation to undo the effect of Jennings v Buchanan. The simplest 
and least intrusive way of achieving this object would be to introduce a new s 13A 
into the Defamation Act 1992, so as to make it clear that a participant in a defamation 
action may not draw on words used during a proceeding of Parliament in order to 
provide any additional meaning to an extra-parliamentary publication.37 There is, of 
course, no legal obstacle to such legislative action in New Zealand, as the powers of 
the House of Representatives are not trammelled by any constitutional document.38  
 However, a possible principled objection to such legislation is that it would be 
an undesirable form of political self-dealing. While the free speech privilege extends 
to all participants in parliamentary proceedings, the primary beneficiaries of the 
immunity it grants are the very MPs who would decide the proper extent of the 
privilege’s ambit. Equally, it is not MPs ¾ who are obliged to develop a tolerance for 
the slings and arrows of parliamentary accusations ¾ who will most desire legal 
redress, but rather private citizens. Hence, were MPs to legislate to undo the effect of 
Jennings v Buchanan, they could be accused of protecting their ability to slander 
private citizens without consequence, at the cost of the common law reputational 
rights of those citizens.  
 There are two responses to such an objection. The first is to ask what is the 
alternative to legislative action. If the courts have got this present issue wrong, as I 
believe they have, then the options are to either live with the undesirable 
consequences of that error, or act to fix it. And fixing the error will require either that 
the country’s new Supreme Court overrule the Privy Council’s decision (an uncertain 
outcome at best, and one that would require enormous litigation expenses for some 
unknown set of parties), or legislative action by the House. Therefore, in spite of the 
risk that MPs might be regarded as protecting their own, the legislative road 
represents the least-worst option of all available. 
                                               
37 This would undo the immediate effect of the decision in Jennings v Buchanan [2004] 
UKPC 36, while still allowing judicial notice to be taken that a proceeding in Parliament has 
occurred as “proof of historical facts”; Prebble v TVNZ [1994] 3 NZLR 1 at 11 (PC). 
38 Indeed, privilege has its basis in ordinary statute; see n 9 above. 
 Finally, any concern that private citizens will be exposed to the risk of an 
ongoing attack on their character by an MP able to hide behind the free speech 
privilege might better be addressed through Parliament’s own internal procedures. 
Standing Orders already allow any person (other than an MP) referred to in the House 
to apply to the Speaker to have a response to that reference included in the 
parliamentary record.39 Similarly, Standing Orders prescribe a series of safeguards 
where allegations that may seriously damage a persons reputation are placed before a 
select committee of the House.40 One possible addition to these measures would be a 
legislative amendment to allow the House to waive its free speech privilege where it 
deems the privilege has been abused by a member.41 Admittedly, this suggestion 
contains a number of problems,42 not the least of which is the danger of such a power 
being applied in a partisan fashion. Nevertheless, if the House is to take back a 
broader institutional privilege of unimpeded free speech for its participants, there is a 
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39 New Zealand Parliament, Standing Orders of the House of Representatives (2004), SO 160-
163. 
40 New Zealand Parliament, Standing Orders of the House of Representatives (2004), SO 234-
238. 
41 The New Zealand House of Representatives has decided that it does not have this power 
currently; see New Zealand Parliament, Interim Report of the Privileges Committee 1991-93, 
AJHR, I, 15B; (1993) NZPD vol 536 at 16191-16195. 
42 See E. Campbell, Parliamentary Privilege (2003) at 137-143. 
